How Ukraine is Gaining the Advantage in the Drone War

From the earliest outset of the war, Russia’s hardware advantage over Ukraine was complete. But now, as the fighting still continues, there has been a gradual shift in power with the Ukrainians appearing to take the upper hand in the drone wars.

It began with Russia’s access to Iranian-made Shahed 131 and 136 one-way attack uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). These early drones were so successful against ill-prepared Ukrainian defence systems that Moscow bought the license to manufacture them in Russia.

However, data collected for the arms industry journal Defense News (based on official Ukrainian Air Force statistics) recently found that, “… the interception rate of Shahed UAS has steadily increased in the past five months, with an average of 91% since March 2024.” Noting that, “By comparison, the average Shahed interception rate during the previous 6 months was 80%, with the highest figure of 83% recorded in November last year. Ukraine’s growing success against the Shaheds stems from the combination of widespread multispectrum sensor coverage and effective tactics, techniques and procedures.”

The change in the balance of drone power is also due to improved Ukrainian defence hardware, training, and organisation. For example, Ukraine currently fields electronic warfare (EW), shoulder-fired air defence systems like Stinger and Igla, anti-aircraft guns like ZU-23-2, and the German-made Gepard, as well as affordable laser-guided rockets like the advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS) supplied by the United States. There is also further high-tech support from imported systems, such as the low-cost guided interceptors like Raytheon's Coyote Block II+ missiles and BAE Systems' APKWS 70mm laser-guided rocket, as well as MANPADS and anti-aircraft guns with airburst ammunition. When these systems are combined with mobile counter-UAS and short-range air defence capabilities the chances of intercepting an incoming enemy drone are high.

Another reason for Ukraine’s growing effectiveness in the drone wars is because of the direct attacks against Russia’s drone teams and infrastructure.

Although Shaheds are becoming less successful, it would be a mistake to undervalue the threat they and other uncrewed aerial vehicles pose. As even if they are shot down, incoming drones can expose the locations of Ukrainian air defence assets, they deplete air defence ammunition stocks, and syphon off resources and workforce that could be used elsewhere.

Even the small percentage of systems (often less than 3%) that are successful in reaching their target can cause significant destruction, particularly when directed towards vital infrastructure. Additionally, when the drones are utilised in saturation attacks with long-range missiles, their efficacy rises significantly.

In response, Ukraine has been developing its own long-range missile which it hopes will prevent Russia from maintaining its strategic advantage of a deep defence. It is called the ‘Palianytsia’ after a kind of bread from Ukraine and a phrase that was used to uncover alleged spies early in the conflict since it is infamously hard to pronounce, and has been hailed by President Zelenskyy as a ‘new class’ of weapon.

Due to secrecy, few specifics are known, but according to one online video, it has a range of almost 700km, which is comparable to the ATACMS provided by the US. At present, the US is prohibiting the use of American hardware being used to attack deep inside Russian territory.

Also on this topic: How America’s Drone Manufacturing Sector is Failing, The Lessons of Counter-Drone Weapons Testing, and What Trump’s Missile Defence Plan Could Learn from Ukraine

This has given Moscow a strategic advantage, as it allows Russia to amass troops, build up supply depots, run repair shops, and maintain a military industrial complex close to the fighting but out of range from Ukrainian attack. Something which the Institute for the Study of War describes as, “[Russia] leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas.”

While an estimated 250 significant militarily targets are in range of US ATACMS missiles, the current rules laid out by Washington limit its use to targets less than about 80km from the Russian/Ukrainian border – only about twenty targets.

“I think this will be a game changer,” said Ukraine’s technology minister, Mykhailo Fedorov. “Because we will be able to strike where Russia doesn’t expect it today.”

While each missile has an estimated $1 million price tag, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi believes that it is a sound investment if the war is to be won. “All types of missiles will be available in Ukraine,” he said. “If we have our own weapons like this, we will feel more independent and confident.”

“This is not an extension of an old Soviet project,” explains one of the project’s insiders in a recent interview with the Associated Press. “[It’s] a completely new development.”

Since the war stabilized after Russia’s failed attempt to capture Kyiv, the battlefields of Ukraine have developed into a lethal testing ground for brand-new weapon designs, modified firearms, and killing machines constructed from whatever technology and explosives were available.

Throughout the all the fighting, both sides have combined civilian and military equipment to create drones and counter-drone devices that could swing the war their way. On the land, in the air, and at sea, drone design capability is being pushed to the limit.

Now, as the development of military hardware in the war continues, it seems that achieving battlefield success is priceless. And only time will tell where military technology will lead us.

STOP PRESS

11th September – The BBC is now reporting that US President Biden is considering ‘ending Ukraine long-range weapons restrictions.’

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